37. savetovanje CIGRE Srbija (2025) SIGURNOST, STABILNOST, POUZDANOST I RESILIENCE ELEKTROENERGETSKOG SISTEMA MULTISEKTORSKO POVEZIVANJE U ENERGETICI I PRIVREDI – C5-05
AUTOR(I) / AUTHOR(S): Aleksandar Janjić
DOI: 10.46793/CIGRE37.C5.05
SAŽETAK / ABSTRACT:
Abstract: A market premium is an incentive for the production of electricity by which the state protects the producer from changes in market prices in relation to the price offered by the producer at auction by paying the difference between the bid price at the auction and the market price. If the market prices are higher than the producer’s bid price at the auction, the producer will pay the difference to the state. The reference market price for the calculation of the market premium is the price of electricity on the Serbian Power Exchange (SEEPEX). At auctions, producers of electricity from renewable sources compete to see who will offer the lowest price at which to sell electricity, and the winners of the auctions will receive a state incentive in the form of a market premium. In this paper, the non-cooperative game theory is used to determine the optimal price that a producer should offer at an auction. The optimal price is determined in terms of the Nash equilibrium in the presence of multiple players (bidders) with different production costs. The expected profit is modelled based on expected power exchange prices and the expected hourly production of the power plant for the period of validity of the incentive. The method is illustrated on the example of the first cycle of auctions in the Republic of Serbia for the allocation of capacities and market premiums to wind turbines. The method has proven to be very successful in determining the price, which would make the participants of the first cycle much more profitable.
KLJUČNE REČI / KEYWORDS:
auction, game theory, wind power plant, market premium
PROJEKAT / ACKNOWLEDGEMENT:
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