RELEVANTNE TEORIJE OTKUPA AKCIJA

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.46793/RZ26.347PT

ABSTRACT / SAŽETAK:

Otkup sopstvenih akcija predstavlja važan mehanizam korporativne finansijske politike, koji se najčešće realizuje diskreciono, omogućavajući kompanijama da prilagode obim i dinamiku isplate trenutnim finansijskim uslovima i proceni tržišne vrednosti akcija. Sa teorijskog aspekta, motivi za otkup akcija u literaturi se najčešće objašnjavaju kroz četiri teorijska okvira: agencijsku teoriju, teoriju signaliziranja, teoriju strukture kapitala i teoriju supstitucije dividendi. Agencijska teorija tumači otkup akcija kao sredstvo za smanjenje slobodnog novčanog toka i ograničavanje oportunističkog ponašanja menadžmenta. Teorija signaliziranja posmatra otkup akcija kao kanal putem kojeg menadžment šalje informacije o budućim poslovnim izgledima kompanije, pri čemu se signalni efekti otkupa češće ispoljavaju kratkoročno, u trenutku objave. Teorija strukture kapitala ističe ulogu otkupa akcija u oblikovanju finansijske strukture, dok teorija supstitucije dividendi ukazuje na mogućnost da otkup akcija predstavlja funkcionalnu zamenu za dividende u određenim institucionalnim i regulatornim uslovima. Empirijska istraživanja pokazuju da se uočavaju vremenski efekti otkupa i različite preferencije zainteresovanih strana, kao i značajan uticaj institucionalnog i regulatornog okvira na primenu navedenih teorija.

KEYWORDS / KLJUČNE REČI:

otkup akcija, agencijska teorija, teorija signaliziranja, teorija strukture kapitala i teoriju supstitucije dividendi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT / PROJEKAT:

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