EKSTERNA REVIZIJA U BORBI PROTIV KORUPCIJE: DOMETI, OGRANIČENJA I SPECIFIČNI IZAZOVI

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.46793/RZ26.081S

ABSTRACT / САЖЕТАК:

Korporativna korupcija predstavlja sveprisutan problem na tržištu kapitala i značajnu pretnju zdravom i stabilnom rastu kompanija. U literaturi se vodi polemika o tome da li, i u kojoj meri, revizija može doprineti borbi protiv korupcije, pri čemu se revizorska profesija pokazuje posebno ranjivom na ovakve izazove. Iako eksterna revizija osnažuje kredibilitet finansijskih izveštaja i doprinosi očuvanju poverenja investitora, očekivanja korisnika u pogledu dometa revizije često nadilaze koristi koje im ona pruža. Međutim, šta se dešava u situacijama kada su očekivanja korisnika razumna, ali ostaju nezadovoljena u pogledu informacija koje bi revizori mogli da obezbede u svojim izveštajima? Polazeći od kritičkog pregleda relevantne akademske literature i analize važećih standarda eksterne revizije koji se odnose na neusklađenost klijenta sa zakonima i propisima, kao i na prevare, cilj ove studije je da ispita odgovornosti eksternih revizora u borbi protiv korupcije. Iako se regulatorni napori u unapređenju okvira u oblasti prevara ne mogu osporiti, standardi revizije i dalje ne posvećuju dovoljno pažnje identifikaciji i oceni rizika korupcije, kao ni odgovorima na njih. Studija stoga ističe potrebu za daljim stručnim raspravama o ambicioznijem definisanju uloge eksterne revizije u uslovima povećanog rizika korporativne korupcije. Takođe pruža preporuke regulatorima, revizorskim firmama i istraživačima, sa ciljem jačanja potencijala revizije kao disciplinujućeg mehanizma za ublažavanje koruptivnih praksi u različitim organizacionim entitetima.

KEYWORDS / КЉУЧНЕ РЕЧИ:

korupcija, eksterna revizija, jaz u očekivanjima, standardi revizije

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT / ПРОЈЕКАТ:

Ovaj istraživački rad finansijski je podržalo Ministarstvo nauke, tehnološkog razvoja i inovacija Republike Srbije (Ugovor broj 451-03-33/2026-03/200371).

Rad je rezultat istraživanja po osnovu obaveza po Ugovoru o prenosu sredstava za finansiranje NIR u 2026. godini (evidencioni broj 451-03-34/2026-03), zaključenog između Ministarstva nauke, tehnološkog razvoja i inovacija Republike Srbije i Ekonomskog fakulteta Univerziteta u Nišu.

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