ГОДИШЊАК МЕЂУНАРОДНЕ ФИЛОЗОФСКЕ ШКОЛЕ ФЕЛИКС РОМУЛИЈАНА 2023. (стр. 169-183)
AUTHOR(S) / АУТОР(И): Vojislav Božičković
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DOI: 10.46793/FelixR24.06VB
ABSTRACT / САЖЕТАК:
It has been claimed that violations of the transparency of thought-contents blur the distinction between errors of reasoning and errors of fact for which reason a view that violates transparency should be rejected. While I show that the given distinction can be blurred even when thought-content is transparent, I argue that a view of thought-content that violates transparency should nonetheless be rejected. For a thought-content must be transparent so as not to be involved in blurring this distinction whereby it fulfills the two related purposes for which we ascribe it to a subject: that of enabling assessments of the subject’s rationality and that of explaining her behaviour. In not being involved with this, it makes it the case that in erring in her reasoning the subject does not act irrationally. I focus on those cases in which the subject confuses the same perceived object for two different ones as well as two different objects for a single one whence she is having a confused belief and reasons in accordance with this
KEYWORDS / КЉУЧНЕ РЕЧИ:
thought-content, reasoning, rationality, irrationality, behaviour
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