Philosophy of mind and mental disorders: the possibility of an interdisciplinary approach

Agrafa, V 6/2024  (стр. 8-50)

АУТОР(И) / AUTHOR(S): Nikola Ačanski

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.46793/Agrafa6.008A

САЖЕТАК / ABSTRACT:

The aim of this paper is to examine some of the implications that three dominant approaches to the phenomenon of mind in the philosophy of mind—physicalism, functionalism, and the phenomenological approach—may have for contemporary concepts of mental disorders. The physicalist framework, as a par excellence reductionist theory of mind, identifies mental disorders with somatic impairments, considering them neurobiological abnormalities of the brain and emphasizing the importance of pharmacological and neurobiological interventions. Functionalism, which understands the mind through its functional roles and computational capacities, allows for the interpretation of mental disorders as dysfunctions in (cognitive) information processing, resulting from faulty reasoning and deviations from standard norms of rational (logical) thinking and decision-making. In contrast, the phenomenological approach focuses on conscious, subjective, and intentional experience, exploring how mental disorders manifest through a loss of meaning, altered perception of reality, or disrupted connectedness with the world. Through an analysis of these theoretical frameworks and their implications for understanding mental disorders, I will highlight the possibilities for interdisciplinary integration of philosophical concepts into psychiatric theories of mental disorders. Emphasizing the need for an interdisciplinary conceptual-methodological approach to understanding mental disorders, I will demonstrate that such an approach is supported by an interactive psychoanalytic position that integrates the neurobiological, cognitive, and existential-subjective dimensions of the human being as both a rational animal and a person.

КЉУЧНЕ РЕЧИ / KEYWORDS:

Philosophy of mind, mental disorders, psychiatry, interactive psychoanalysis.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT / ПРОЈЕКАТ:

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